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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CHARITABLE TRUSTS: Supreme Court Rejects
Applicability of State Action to a Discriminatory Charitable Trust.
INTRODUCTION
In Evans v. Abney' the Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed a decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Georgia2 that
certain land devised through a testamentary trust to Macon, Georgia, for
the unconstitutional purpose of providing a public park for white persons
only should revert to the testator's heirs.
The litigation began in 1963 when members of the park's Board of
Managers' brought an equitable petition in a state court against the
city of Macon, alleging that it had violated the provisions of the trust
by admitting blacks into the park.4 The facts are not in dispute. In
1911, Augustus 0. Bacon, a United States Senator, devised to the
Mayor and Council of the city of Macon a tract of land (Baconsfield)
to be used as a park and pleasure ground by white people only.' The
city of Macon was designated as trustee, subject to the control of the
Board of Managers. The city enforced segregation for some years but
then admitted blacks, taking the position that it could not constitutionally
maintain a segregated park.'
After the Board of Managers initiated its action, the city resigned
as trustee. The court appointed three "private persons" as trustees,"
1. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
2. Evans v. Abney, 224 Ga. 826, 165 S.E.2d 160 (1968).
3. Charles E. Newton and others.
4. Evans v. Newton, 220 Ga. 280, 138 S.E.2d 573 (1964).
5. Senator Bacon's will provided that the park should be for "the sole, perpetual
and unending use, benefit and enjoyment of the white women, white girls, white boys
and white children of the City of Macon .... " And he continued:
I take occasion to say that in limiting the use and enjoyment of the
property perpetually to white people, I am not influenced by an unkindness
of feeling or want of consideration for the Negroes, or colored people. On
the contrary I have for them the kindest feeling, and for many of them
esteem and regard, while for some of them I have sincere personal affection.
I am however, without hesitation in the opinion that in their social
relations the two races should be forever separate and that they should not
have pleasure or recreation grounds to be used or enjoyed, together and in com-
mon.
396 U.S. at 442.
6. See Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 387 (1957) which states: "A court
may remove a trustee of a charitable trust if his continuing to act as trustee would be
detrimental to the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust."
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thereby denying the petition made by several intervening black citizens
of Macon8 who alleged that the racial limitation was violative of the
public policy of the United States.' The Georgia Supreme Court upheld
the trial court's decision,'" but the United States Supreme Court reversed
and remanded in Evans v. Newton." Justice Douglas, who wrote the
majority opinion," held that the public character of the park required
it to be treated as a public institution regardless of who had title under
state law.' 3 On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court interpreted the
reversal as requiring that the park be operated on a non-discriminatory
basis. Since the sole purpose of the trust became impossible of accomplish-
ment, the court terminated it." The trial court, on remand to consider a
motion for a ruling that the park had reverted to the Bacon estate,
refused to apply the cy pres doctrine to strike the racial restrictions of
the will. It was determined that since the sole purpose of the trust was in
irreconcilable conflict with the Constitution, the trust property had, by
operation of law, reverted to the heirs of Senator Bacon.'6 On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision.'
Evans v. Abney was then brought on a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States.' 8 Justice Black, writing for the
8. Reverend E. S. Evans and others.
9. Residuary heirs of Senator Bacon had also intervened asking that if the court
did not appoint private trustees the property should revert to them.
10. Evans v. Newton, 220 Ga. 280, 138 S.E.2d 573 (1964).
11. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
12. Justice White concurred separately, and Justices Black, Harlan and Stewart
dissented.
13. 382 U.S. at 302.
14. Evans v. Newton, 221 Ga. 870, 148 S.E.2d 329 (1966).
15. Georgia has codified the cy pres doctrine as follows:
When a valid charitable bequest is incapable for some reason of execu-
tion in the exact manner provided by the testator, donor, or founder, a court
of equity will carry it into effect in such a way as will nearly as possible
effectuate his intention.
GA. COD ANN. § 108-202 (1959). The cy pres doctrine is discussed in 4 A. ScoTT,
TRUSTS, § 399 (3d ed. 1967).
16. Senator Bacon apparently did not comtemplate failure of the trust, and he made
no provision in his will granting a reverter to any party should the trust fail. However,
Georgia law, which, in effect, provides a possibility of reverter to the heirs, makes
such an omission irrelevant:
Where a trust is expressly created, but [its] uses . . . fail from any cause, a
resulting trust is implied for the benefit of the grantor, or testator, or his
heirs.
GA. CODE ANN. § 108-106(4) (1959).
17. Evans v. Abney, 224 Ga. 826, 165 S.E.2d 160 (1968).
18. 396 U.S. 435 (1970). Petitioners, the same black citizens of Macon who
sought in the courts to integrate Baconsfield, contended that the termination cf the
trust violated their rights to equal protection and due process under the fourteenth
amendment.
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majority,19 held that the Georgia courts did no more than apply well-
settled principles of Georgia law in construing the will. Since the Georgia
court violated no constitutionally protected rights by concluding that
cy pres could not be applied to save the park, the Supreme Court affirmed
its decision.
BALANCING RIGHTS
Justice Black balances2" the state's right to construct its citizens'
wills against the desire (apparently not the right) of Macon blacks to
enjoy a large public park' which had been used exclusively by whites
for nearly fifty years and maintained and improved with public funds.
The Georgia Supreme Court decided that Senator Bacon would rather
see Baconsfield revert to his heirs than to have it used as a racially
integrated park." Justice Black states that "construction of wills is
essentially a state law question .. . ."" Although "no state law can
prevail in the face of contrary federal law ... the action of the Georgia
Supreme Court . . . presents no violation of constitutionally protected
rights ... " He justifies his finding that the state's right to control
its property is more important than preserving a park: "the loss of
charitable trusts such as Baconsfield is part of the price we pay for per-
mitting deceased persons to exercise a continuing control over assets
owned by them at death."25
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
The black petitioners alleged that their fourteenth amendment rights
of "due process" and "equal protection" were violated by the closing of
the park. The fourteenth amendment sets forth that no "State shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
19. Justices Douglas and Brennan dissented, and Justice Marshall abstained.
20. Balancing the rights of the parties to decide fourteenth amendment cases, as
opposed to searching for significant state action, was perhaps foreshadowed by Justice
Black in his dissent in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 242-43 (1964). There he
balanced the right asserted by a restaurant owner to use his property as he desired
against the right of blacks to be free from discrimination; he found the private
owner's right outweighed the right of the blacks to equal accommodations. See
Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 387, 418
(1967).
21. Baconsfield comprises about 100 acres.
22. Justice Douglas in his dissent argues that Senator Bacon's purpose was to
dedicate the land for some municipal use, and continuation of the use as a municipal
park would carry out a larger share of the testator's purpose than would a reversion
to his heirs.
23. 396 U.S. at 444.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 446.
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law," 6 and since the Civil Rights Cases," a finding of state action is a
prerequisite to the application of the fourteenth amendment.2" Justice
Black avoided the term "state action." He held that the Georgia court
correctly applied the state's trust law and that it violated no constitutional
rights. He does, however, discuss some cases 9 where a state's actions
have violated the fourteenth amendment.
Justice Black distinguishes a public facility closing merely to avoid
desegreation by saying that in the instant case a private party, not the
state, is injecting the racially discriminatory motivation."0 This same
"private motivation" was present in Shelley v. Kraemer 1 and its
progeny82 where a state court's enforcement of a restrictive covenant
was held to be state involvement in discrimination violative of the four-
teenth amendment.8" The Court distinguishes Shelley by finding another
factual difference; the park has been eliminated altogether, and therefore,
there is no more discrimination." This "elimination" argument was
made in Griffin v. County School Board," where a county closed its
schools to avoid a court order to desegregate them. The school board
alleged there would be no more discrimination in the schools because
there would be no more schools, but the Court held that the action of the
county in closing the public schools and meanwhile contributing to the
support of private, segregated schools resulted in denying to black school
children the equal protection of the laws. It cannot be said that the
elimination of the public facility eliminates the discrimination; the
elimination itself is the discrimination. Perhaps the real significance of
the "private motivation" and "elimination" arguments is that they are
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
27. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). "It is State action of a particular character that is
prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the
[fourteenth] amendment." Id. at 11.
28. See, e.g., Black, "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Pro-
position 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69 (1967) ; Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro
Freedom, 21 RUraERs L. REV. 387 (1967).
29. 396 U.S. at 445.
30. Id. The majority also points out that there is no showing that Senator Bacon
was racially motivated by the Georgia statutes which enabled him to devise a dis-
criminatory charitable trust, GA. CODE ANN. § 69-504 (1957), nor that the Georgiajudges were racially motivated. 396 U.S. at 446.
31. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
32. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), extended the holding of the
Shelley case to invalidate an attempt at judicial enforcement of a restrictive covenant
in a suit for damages.
33. See also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), where the operation of a
company town, and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), where the domination of the
elective process are ostensibly private but so governmental in nature that fourteenth
amendment limitations must be applied.
34. 396 U.S. at 445.
35. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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both available. In neither Shelley nor Griffin were both of these factors
present, but in the instant case the act of discrimination was the elimina-
tion of a public facility, and the discrimination was privately motivated.
STATE ACTION AND WILLING PARTIES
The issue in Evans v. Abney was whether the park property should
revert to the heirs. Petitioners alleged that the fourteenth amendment was
violated by the Georgia court's decision that Baconsfield did revert;
however, the elimination of the park by the Georgia court must be the
alleged act of discrimination. The issue was not whether the park can be
segregated; Evans v. Newton"0 already decided that because of its public
character Baconsfield could not remain segregated. Thus in a search for
state action which violates "due process" and "equal protection," one
must look for state action involved in the elimination of the park and not
for state action involved in the maintenance of a segregated park.
Justice Brennan in his dissent points to "state action in overwhelm-
ing abundance." 7 Baconsfield has been a public park for nearly fifty
years; the Georgia legislature gave discrimination a "special preferred
status in the law" with statutes which enabled discriminatory charitable
trusts;"8 capital improvements have been made with both federal and
city money;" and general maintenance was the responsibility of the
city's superintendent of parks. Furthermore, the Georgia courts appointed
private trustees to continue segregation when the city could no longer
discriminate.4" The areas of the state's involvement in Baconsfield argued
by Justice Brennan to violate the fourteenth amendment apply to Evans
v. Newton; if Baconsfield is to be a park, it must be an integrated park.
But in Evans v. Abney the discrimination complained of is the elimina-
tion of the park, and the only4' state involvement in the loss of Bacons-
field is the Georgia court's interpretation of Senator Bacon's will.
Justice Brennan's dissent also argues that Shelley v. Kraemer is in
36. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
37. 396 U.S. at 445.
38. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), where the Court held that when
a state singles out racial discrimination for particular encouragement, it is in violation
of the fourteenth amendment even though the state does not itself impose or compel
segregation.
39. In the 1930's the Works Progress Administration transformed Baconsfield
from a wilderness to a modern recreational facility upon the city's representation that
it was a public park. 396 U.S. at 451.
40. Evans v. Newton, 220 Ga. 280, 138 S.E.2d 160 (1968).
41. It may be argued that the enabling statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 69-504 (1957),
played a part in the park's elimination. For an argument that it did not, see Parker,
Evans v. Newton and the Racially Restricted Charitable Trust, 13 How. L.J. 223,
232-35 (1967).
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point and that it should be applied to preserve Baconsfield. 2 Can this
judicial action be considered significant state action when compared
with Shelley? There must be limitations on the application of judicial
action to fourteenth amendment cases, or any court which enforces truly
private discrimination will be subject to reversal by a higher court
applying Shelley to the fourteenth amendment." The limitation is found
in Shelley's language: "willing parties" would have done business "but
for the active intervention of the state courts. . . ."" Were there willing
parties in Macon, Georgia, who would have done business "but for" the
Georgia courts? Before that question can be answered, it must be deter-
mined who are the proper "parties." In Shelley there was a "willing"
purchaser and a "willing" seller. Except for the restrictive covenant,
there is no contention that the seller did not have the power to convey
the title. In the instant case, the black citizens of Macon are certainly
"willing" to enjoy the park, but who has the "power" to allow integra-
tion, contrary to the terms of the trust?" There are four possibilities
under this testamentary trust: 1) the Board of Managers as superin-
tendents of the park, 2) the city of Macon as trustee and appointor of
the Board of Managers, 3) the white citizens as the beneficiaries
of the trust or 4) the residual heirs who would receive the property if
the trust failed. As Justice Brennan points out, the city was initially
willing to admit blacks, and there is no showing that the white benefici-
aries were unwilling to share Senator Bacon's generosity with the
blacks." The Board of Managers who initiated the suit to enforce
segregation are certainly not willing parties nor are the residual heirs
who sought reversion. Thus it is doubtful that Justice Brennan has
established the applicability of Shelley. He does not address himself to
the question of who are the proper "willing" parties; he merely states
that there is no showing that the city of Macon and its white population
are not willing to integrate Baconsfield."
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court decided that a state's right to construct its
citizens' wills is paramount to the right of black citizens to enjoy a
segregated public park. The Court reasons that the fourteenth amendment
42. 396 U.S. at 456-57.
43. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 231 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting).
44. 334 U.S. at 19.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 381 (1957).
46. 396 U.S. at 457.
47. The majority states that Shelley does not apply because there is no more
discrimination since the park is eliminated. This ignores the fact that the elimination
of the park is the complained of discrimination.
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rights of the blacks are not violated because the discrimination was
motivated by an individual, and there is no discrimination because the
park was eliminated. Although neither fact is sufficient alone to take a
case out of the protection of the fourteenth amendment, it is significant
that both are present in Evans v. Abney. In his dissent, Justice Brennan
does not present convincing arguments that Shelley v. Kraemer applies
nor does he show that state action was. involved in the park's elimination.
"When a city park is destroyed because the Constitution required it to
be integrated, there is reason for everyone to be disheartened,"4 but the
decision seems to be a correct interpretation of the Constitution and the
laws of the land.
48. 396 U.S. at 444.
LABOR LAW-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Supreme Court Limits Employer
Speech on Unionization.
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co.,' decided several important questions in the areas of labor and
constitutional law. The unanimous opinion held, inter alia, 1) that an
employer's obligation to bargain with a union may arise without a
representation election, 2) that union authorization cards, if obtained
without misrepresentation or coercion, are sufficiently reliable to indicate
a union's majority status, 3) that the National Labor Relations Board'
may issue a bargaining order to an employer who has rejected a union's
indicated card majority while committing unfair labor practices which
tend to undermine the union's majority and make a fair election unlikely
and 4) that certain types of statements by an employer are not protected
under the free speech provision of the first amendment.
The case came to the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari as a
consolidation of four cases, three from the Fourth Circuit8 and one
from the First Circuit.' The exact pattern of events varied from case to
case; however, in each of the cases from the Fourth Circuit, a union
waged an organizational campaign and obtained cards from a majority of
1. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
2. Hereinafter referred to as NLRB or the Board.
3. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1968) ; NLRB v. Heck's,
Inc., 398 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968) ; General Steel Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 398
F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1968).
4. NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968).
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employees within the bargaining unit. The union then demanded re-
cognition as the employees' bargaining agent. The employers, however,
refused recognition because they considered such cards to be an un-
reliable indicia of employee sentiment. The employers then either began
or continued antiunion campaigns.
The NLRB subsequently issued bargaining orders based primarily,
upon the employers' lack of "good faith doubt" as to the validity of the
authorization card majorities in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act.' The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, declined to enforce the orders.
The court ruled that union authorization cards were inherently unreliable
as an indication of employee sentiment, and therefore a refusal to bargain
collectively in violation of section 8(a) (5) of the Taft-Hartley Act
did not occur.' The court further ruled that unfair labor practices, such
as interfering, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of section
7 rights7 and discriminating for or against employees to encourage
or discourage membership in a union in violation of section 8(a) (1) and
(3), were not proper grounds for issuance of a bargaining order since
an election is the sole basis provided for representative certification under
the Taft-Hartley Act.8 The fact situation in NLRB v. Sinclair Co.'
was similar; however, the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
Board's bargaining order.'"
The Supreme Court's decision that the representative status of a
union may be determined by means other than election is not novel. The
decision follows a prior ruling which recognized that section 9(c) of the
Taft-Hartley Act does not specify how employees shall select or designate
5. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a) (5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (5) (1964). The act, in relevant part, provides:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(5) to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representative of his employees, subject to the
provisions of section 9(a) of this act.
Id.
6. Id.
7. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1964). Section 7 states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor or-
ganization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a) (3).
Id.
8. Id. § 9(c). See also 13 NLRB ANN. REP. 32 (1948). The Supreme Court's
decision in Gissel would seem to imply that if authorization cards can indicate employee
sentiment no question of representation exists for determination by election.
9. 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968).
10. Id.
19701
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their collective bargaining representative. 1 If authorization cards
accurately reflect the views of the signers, then such cards should be
considered a valid means of designating a collective bargaining rep-
resentative. In order to insure the cards' reliability, the Court specified
that they must be unambiguous, single-purpose cards obtained without
coercion or misrepresentation.
While violation of section 8(a) (5) will not alone support issuance
of a bargaining order,'" the Court ruled that such violation, coupled with
other independent unfair labor practices which also would be insufficient
to support an order, may combine to provide a basis for the order to
issue."
A more comprehensive discussion of the foregoing points may be
found elsewhere.1" The remainder of this comment will explore the
background of Board and court decisions treating the question of
employer's free speech rights, some possible effects of the decision in
Gissel and the absence of dissent in Gissel.
EMPLOYER'S FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
Historically, the NLRB has taken a number of different positions
on the question of the right of an employer to make known to his
employees his views on unionization. Under the 1935 Wagner Act,'"
the Board policy was one of silent neutrality.' This policy was altered
to conform to a Sixth Circuit ruling permitting an employer to circulate
printed statements.""
In 1942, the Board announced the "captive audience" doctrine,
holding that an employer could not speak to his employees on company
time because of the coercive effect.' 9 This ruling was appealed, and the
Sixth Circuit ruled that an employer was free to speak, even to a captive
audience, if his speech was without threat and not part of conduct
11. United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 71-72
(1955).
12. 395 U.S. at 606-07. See also id. at 583 n.4.
13. Id. at 601 n.18.
14. Id. at 614.
15. Yound, Supreme Court Decisions, 55 A.B.A.J. 1079 (1969); 50 B.U.L. REV.
111 (1969); 21 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 305 (1970) ; 1969 DUKE L.J. 1075 (1969);
38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 319 (1969); 83 HARV. L. REv. 247 (1970); 21 S.C.L. REV.
805 (1969); 4 SUFFOLK U.L REV. 160 (1969); 21 SYRACUSE L. Rzv. 337 (1969);
15 VILL. L. REv. 106 (1969).
16. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1935).
17. S. COHEN, LABOR LAW 219 (1964) [hereinafter cited as COHEN].
18. NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1940).
19. American Tube Bending Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 121 (1942).
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showing coercion."0
The Board then adopted an "equal time" modification;21 this
policy prohibited employer speech to a captive audience unless the union
be accorded the same privilege. This policy was approved on appeal by
the Second Circuit." The "equal time" modification virtually required
employers to maintain silent neutrality; employer comments were per-
mitted only if not coercive, either on their face or as seen in the general
course of conduct, and if equal time and opportunity were afforded to
the union."
With the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947," the "equal
time" doctrine was abandoned.25 In 1951, however, the Board apparently
revived the doctrine in the Bonwit Teller case.2" On appeal, the Second
Circuit held that employees have a right to hear both sides of the
question but that the concept of providing strict equal time and oppor-
tunity for each side to speak should not be enforced.2
Following the Bonwit Teller case, the Board continued to demand
that equal time and opportunity to be afforded to all parties." This rigid
adherence to the original notion of "equal time" was finally overcome
in Livingston Shirt Corp.2" This change of policy is best explained,
perhaps, by the change in Board personnel occasioned by the appoint-
ments of President Eisenhower."0 Later modifications included a ruling
that no party may make speeches within 24 hours of an election"' and
a holding that noncoercive speech accompanied by unfair labor practices
would not necessarily constitute a violation of section 8(c) of Taft-
Hartley. 2
Although the term "coercive speech" has frequently been used, no
clear definition has emerged." Written expressions that a union was
20. American Tube Bending Co. v. NLRB, 134 F.2d 993 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 768 (1943).
21. Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946).
22. NLRB v. Clark Bros. Co., 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947).
23. COHENq at 222.
24. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-
88 (1964).
25. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948).
26. Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951).
27. Bonwit Teller, Inc., v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952).
28. See, e.g., Onandaga Pottery Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1143 (1952); Metropolitan
Auto Parts, Inc., 99 N.L.R.B. 401 (1952). See also COEEN at 226.
29. 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
30. COHEN at 227.
31. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
32. NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, 357 U.S. 257 (1958).
33. Both the Board and courts have struggled for a definition without having ar-
rived at a workable final result.
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
1970]
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 [1970], Art. 10
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol5/iss1/10
182 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
"un-Christian, un-American, and un-Democratic" ' and a prophecy that
unionization might lead to plant closing"5 have been held to be merely
opinion and not coercive. An employer's statement that any vote for a
union is a sure vote for a strike or lockout was also considered to be
noncoercive speech."'
The position represented by these decisions, however, was abdicated
in 1962 when the Board found statements previously accepted as
expressions of opinion to be coercive. 7 This change in Board policy may
be attributed to the Kennedy administration appointees to the Board.88
The decision of the Supreme Court in Gissel has not succeeded in
bringing order from the confusion of Board and lower court holdings re-
flected in the foregoing paragraphs. An employer is still without a clear-
cut standard for judging whether his communications will be adjudged
coercive. The Court's statement that "he [employer] can easily make
his views known without engaging in 'Brinksmanship'" coupled with
the proviso that a reviewing court "must recognize the Board's compe-
tence" to judge the employer's remarks"9 provides little in the way of
positive guidance and may make the NLRB, at least to some extent,
the final arbiter on questions of employers' rights of free speech. Many
statements which were once acceptable have now been proscribed."0
Uncertainty concerning the Board's attitude at any given time may have
a dampening effect upon employer attempts to express views on questions
of unionization.
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not consti-
tute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions
of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force
or promise of benefit.
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c)
(1964).
34. Supplee-Biddle-Steltz Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 458 (1956). In Supplee-Biddle-
Steltz the employer sent out communications calling the union "un-Christian, un-
American, and un-Democratic" and implying that the plant might close in the event of
a union victory.
35. Chicopee Mfg. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 106 (1953). In Chicopee the employer
expressed the opinion that his plant might be forced to move should the union win a
representative election. Such utterances would now seem proscribed in view of the
Supreme Court's agreement with the First Circuit's decision in Sinclair that
[c]onveyance of the employer's belief, even though sincere, that unionization
will or may .result in the closing of the plant is not a statement of fact
unless, which is most improbable, the eventuality of closing is capable of
proof.
397 F.2d 157, 160 (1st Cir. 1968) (emphasis added).
36. National Furniture Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1 (1957).
37. Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962).
38. COHEN at 231.
39. 395 U.S. at 620.
40. See notes 34 and 35 supra and accompanying text.
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FREE SPEECH AND JUSTICE BLACK
One puzzling aspect of the Gissel decision remains. Constitutional
scholars may well ask, "Where was Justice Black?" The decision was
without dissent although Justice Black has consistently dissented when
any barriers to free speech have been sanctioned by the Court.4' He has
summarized his belief in the following statement:
My view is, without deviation, without exception, without
any ifs, buts, or whereases, that freedom of speech means
that the government shall not do anything to people, or, in the
words of the Magna Carta, move against people, either for the
views they have or the views they express or the words they
speak or write .... As I have said innumerable times before I
simply believe that "Congress shall make no Law" means
Congress shall make no law. 2
He has also decried the "balancing test."
Of these [tests] the most dangerous I believe is the so-called
balancing test. The Court's balancing test in effect says that the
First Amendment should be read to say "Congress shall pass
no law abridging freedom of speech, press, assembly and
petition, unless Congress and the Supreme Court reach the
joint conclusion that on balance the interest of the government
in stifling these freedoms is greater than the interest of the
people in having them exercised." This is closely akin to the
notion that neither the First Amendment nor any other pro-
vision of the Bill of Rights should be enforced unless the Court
believes it is reasonable to do so.4"
It is difficult to imagine how one with such strong views on the
absolute quality of freedom of speech could avoid dissent in such a case as
Gissel."4 The Court clearly has placed a restriction upon the employer's
freedom of speech by use of the balancing test; in spite of this, Gissel
41. See generally Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959); Kingsley Int'l
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) ; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947). See also Black, The
Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865 (1960).
42. H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 45 (1969).
43. Id. at 50.
44. While all four of the cases consolidated in Gissel were factually similar,
Sinclair seems to present a stronger basis for dissent. The acts and statements of the
employer in Sinclair bear a marked resemblance to the employer conduct sanctioned
by the NLRB during the Eisenhower administration.
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was a unanimous decision and we are left with no visible clue to aid in
solving the-apparent mystery of Justice Black's silence.
CONCLUSION
There is still a lack of explicit guidelines by which an employer may
determine whether his speech or written statements may be adjudged
coercive. Employers who are faced with uncertain standards may feel
forced to remain silent thus giving the decision in Gissel a more restric-
tive effect than the Court surely intended.
During pre-election campaigns, union organizers may stress the
possibility of gaining economic benefits for the workers if the union is
chosen to be the employees' bargaining agent. At the same time, the
employer may not express his beliefs about the possible effects of
unionization upon his company's financial position unless his statements
are capable of proof. The requirement of proof, however, is not mentioned
in section 8 (c). 45
If employers choose or feel forced to remain silent, the flow of
information upon which the employees are to rely as a basis for making
their choice will become one-sided. The laboratory conditions which the
Board deems necessary for conducting a proper election may be as
easily upset by an imbalance of opportunity or information in one
direction as in another. This court-approved need for "clinical purity"
in the conduct of representative elections is also in conflict with the
traditional democratic idea that a free flow of information is absolutely
necessary to insure that voters may make an enlightened choice.
It may be difficult to set definite standards for permissible speech
by employers because of the problems of semantics and basic human
nature. It would seem, however, that a more workable standard should
yet emerge.
45. For the text of § 8(c) see note 33 supra.
CRIMINAL LAW-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: The Applicability of General
Public Lewdness Statutes to Live Theatrical Performances
INTRODUCTION
The theater has always been in the vanguard of experimentation
with the various modes of communication and expression. With the
dawning of the age of Aquarius it seems that sex and nudity have
become the dominant vehicles of experimentation and expression on the
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stage. Juxtaposed against this spirit of theatrical permissiveness and
iconoclasm is a judicial and legislative struggle to formulate viable
perimeters of legitimate expression in the theater. Illustrative of the
multidimensional nature of the issues confronting the courts in this area
is the applicability of the general public lewdness statute to live theatrical
performances. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of California has
addressed itself to these issues and has brought the arguments for and
against applicability into focus.
In Barrows v. Municipal Court,1 the Supreme Court of California
reversed a lower court refusal to issue a writ of prohibition. The writ
had been sought to restrain the Municipal Court of Los Angeles from
proceeding with the prosecution of the petitioners. The defendants in
the Barrows case were charged with violation of section 647(a) of the
California Penal Code for their production of a one-act play entitled
The Beard.' Pursuant to section 290 of the California Penal Code, a
conviction under section 647(a) would require the convicted individual
to register with the local law enforcement officials as a sex offender.'
In a four to three decision, the Barrows court ruled that the portion of
section 6 4 7 (a) making it a misdemeanor to engage in lewd or dissolute
conduct in a public place was inapplicable to live performances before
an audience.
THE ARGUMENT AGAINST APPLICABILITY
The majority in the Barrows case found the basic purpose of
section 647 to be the punishment of vagrancy in its various overt
aspects. It found nothing in the legislative history of the statute indicat-
ing that it was intended to apply to activities such as live theatrical
1. 1 Cal. 3d 821, 464 P.2d 483, 83 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1970).
2. The petitioners were actors Richard Bright and Alexandria Hay, producer
Robert Barrows and director Robert Gist.
The play consists of one act with two actors who portray Jean Harlow and
Billy the Kid in a post-death sitting. After engaging in various degrees of verbal
gymnastics, the two actors conclude the performance with a simulated sex act. The
specific acts alleged in the complaint were ones of oral copulation.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(a) (West 1967) provides:
Every person who solicits anyone to engage in or who engages in lewd or
dissolute conduct in any public place or in any place open to the public or
exposed to the public view . . . [shall be guilty of disorderly conduct or a
misdemeanor].
Id.
3. The statute requires the convicted offender to keep the law enforcement
officials informed of his location. Since the legislature deemed such individuals likely
to commit similar offenses in the future, the statute operates on the theory that
persons convicted of crimes enumerated in the statute should be readily available for
police questioning at all times.
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performances which are prima facie within the ambit of first amendment
protection.' Speaking for the majority, Justice Mosk asserted that if
section 647(a) was applicable to a live performance, there would be no
rationale for not also applying the registration provisions of section
290." Justice Mosk stated:
It would be irrational to impose upon an actor in a theatrical
performance or its director a lifetime requirement of registra-
tion as a sexual offender because he may have performed or
aided in the performance of an act, perhaps an obscene gesture,
in a play.6
Prior to the Barrows decision, the petitioners entered federal district
court requesting an injunction against enforcement of section 647(a).'
Dissenting from the three-judge district court decision to invoke the
abstention doctrine and not issue the injunction, Justice Ferguson stated:
The use of § 647 (a) to stop a legitimate theatrical presentation
results in censorship of any and all expression which some
official of government deems proscribed by the broad and vague
language of the statute. In this area it is not only that persons
are faced with unascertainable standards of guilt, but that the
very vagueness and ambiguity of the statute imposes a self-
censorship among all persons who are justifiably uncertain as
to its scope. The intolerable end result is a denial of the public's
access to constitutionally protected speech and press out of fear
of criminal prosecution.'
A serious equal protection problem would accompany a ruling of
applicability of section 647 (a) to live theatrical presentations. Con-
viction under the lewdness statute for acts committed in a live theatrical
production would require the performer's registration as a sex offender.
Conviction for the same acts, however, committed in the filming of a
motion picture would not require registration.'
The Barrows decision does not suggest that acts which are in-
dependently prohibited by law may be performed on the stage with
immunity merely because they occur during the course of a theatrical
4. 1 Cal. 3d at 826, 464 P.2d at 486, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
5. Id. at 827, 464 P.2d at 487, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
6. Id. at 827, 464 P.2d at 486, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
7. Barrows v. Reddin, 301 F. Supp. 574 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
8. Id. at 582.
9. A private movie studio from which the public is excluded would not be a public
place, a place open to the public or one exposed to public view.
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production.10 Obviously, dramatic license cannot justify "the actual
murder of the villain, the rape of the heroine, or the maiming of the
hero."" The majority opinion, however, does make it clear that conduct
or speech in a theatrical production is to be judged by a different standard
than is the same conduct or speech occurring in the streets. Relying upon
one of its recent decisions, the Barrows court ruled that acts which
are unlawful in a different context, circumstance or place may be
depicted or incorporated in a stage or screen presentation and come
within the protection of the first amendment, losing that protection only
if found to be obscene.1
2
THE ARGUMENT SUPPORTING APPLICABILITY
The dissenting opinion in the Barrows case, along with an earlier
supreme court decision and a California court of appeals case, delineate
the argument for applying the public lewdness statute to live stage
productions. The majority in the Barrows case found it necessary to
clarify and modify its own decision in In re Giannini.'3 Although the
Giannini decision did not directly consider the applicability of the
registration requirement to conviction under section 647 (a), the decision
did appear to stand for the applicability of the section to live theatrical
performances." The Barrows court also disapproved of Dixon v.
Municipal Court" insofar as the Dixon decision was inconsistent with
Barrows. In attempting to follow the Giannini decision, the Dixon court
had held that section 647(a) was to be applied to a live performance in
San Francisco of the very play under consideration in the Barrows case."
In response to the majority contention that there was nothing in the
legislative history of the statute to indicate an intent to make it applicable
to stage productions, Justice Burke, expressing the dissenting opinion
of the Barrows case, took an opposite approach. He argued that there
was nothing in the language of the section which would indicate a
legislative intent to exclude such conduct merely because it occurred
during a theatrical performance. In the interval between the handing
10. 1 Cal. 3d at 830, 464 P.2d at 489, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
11. Id.
12. In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1968).
13. Id.
14. The action of the court in remanding the petitioners for possible retrial is a
recognition of the applicability of section 647(a) to theatrical performers.
15. 267 Cal. App. 2d 789, 73 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1968).
16. In both the Dixon and Barrows cases the actors were also charged with a
violation of section 311.6 of the California Penal Code which provides: "Every person
who knowingly sings or speaks any obscene song, ballad, or other words, in any public
place is guilty of a misdemeanor." CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.6 (West 1967).
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down of the Giannini decision and the Barrows case, the California
State Legislature amended portions of section 647 but chose to leave
subdivision (a) as it stood. Upon this basis, Justice Burke presumed
that the legislature was aware of the judicial construction and approved
it. The presumption stemmed from the fact that the statute had been
construed by judicial decision and that its judicial construction had not
been altered by subsequent legislation.17  Quoting from the Dixon
decision, the Barrows dissent contended:
It cannot be reasonably believed that the Legislature intended
to allow any and all acts which are patently obscene to be com-
mitted on stages, runways or other performing areas-but this
would be the effect (except as to acts specifically made criminal
under other statutes; for example, sodomy) of holding section
647, subdivision (a), inapplicable.'"
The Justice asked whether it would not be more logical to withhold
judgment on the applicability of section 290 to a theatrical performer
rather than hold all persons immune from prosecution for obscene
performances because registration may not be highly pertinent to their
case.'" A violation of section 647(a) on the stage could be punishable
under section 19 of the California Penal Code as a misdemeanor for which
specific punishment is not prescribed." Theatrical performances are not
directly referred to in any subdivision of section 647. The omission,
absent further evidence of legislative intent, should not be interpreted as
creating immunity from prosecution for such activity. In ruling on the
applicability of section 64 7 (a), the Dixon court reasoned:
Within the content of a play, a ballet, a dance or another
performance, there may be done an act, which, even when it is
placed in the dialogue, choreography or surroundings of the
whole work, and with all First Amendment protection thrown
about it, nevertheless, is a lewd act.2 '
17. 1 Cal. 3d at 832, 464 P.2d at 491, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
18. Id. at 833, 464 P.2d at 490, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 826. The court quoted
Dixon v. Municipal Court, 267 Cal. App. 2d 789, 73 Cal. Rptr. 587, 589 (1968).
19. 267 Cal. App. 2d 789, 791, 73 Cal. Rptr. 587, 589 (1968).
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 19 (West 1967) provides:
Except in cases where a different punishment is prescribed by any law of this
state, every offense declared to be a misdemeanor is punishable by imprison-
ment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by fine not exceeding
five hundred dollars, or by both.
Id.
21. 267 Cal. App. 2d 789, 791, 73 Cal. Rptr. 587, 589 (1968).
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Dealing with the question of legislative intent, the Dixon court con-
tended:
It would be hard to believe that the Legislature intended that
obscene acts of almost any kind are to be outside the law
merely because they are incorporated into some kind of dramatic
presentation. If it were so, the rankest of acts would be exhibited
by writing some lines, somewhat relevant, around the acts.22
Despite the extensive discussion of legislative intent by the advocates
and opponents to applicability of the lewdness statute, the decisive
factor in the findings of the Barrows court seems to have been the
registration requirement of section 290. Had the petitioners not faced
registration as sex offenders, the strength of the argument against applica-
bility would suffer.2" If at a future date the California State Legislature
should find it expedient to provide for an exemption from the registration
provision for the person convicted in connection with a theatrical pre-
sentation, the Supreme Court of California may once again find itself
clarifying and modifying its position on the applicability of section 647 (a).
POSTSCRIPT ON APPLICABILITY
As the practitioners of the new modes of theatrical expression
disseminate their product, an increasing number of courts will be called
upon to determine the applicability of their particular jurisdiction's
public lewdness statutes. The courts will be determining whether the
general public lewdness statutes are to be employed as tools of effective
censorship of theatrical performances.24 Those who place first priority
on freedom of expression in the theater should not assume that the
courts in other states will necessarily follow the precedent established in
California. California is unique in requiring registration of anyone con-
victed under provisions similar to section 647(a). Consequently, the
arguments for applicability of the lewdness statute are much weaker in
California than in jurisdictions lacking registration provisions or cor-
responding exemptions. The courts do not seem ready to accept violation
22. Id.
23. In the absence of a registration requirement, all the arguments for inap-
plicability except the equal protection problem would lose much of their plausibility.
Both the irrationality and legislative intent arguments of the Barrows majority are
based on the requirement that violators must register as sex offenders.
24. Thirty-five states have statutes essentially the same as California's lewdness
provisions. The states, however, do not have registration requirements. The pro-
visions are found under the general heading of lewdness or indecency in the various
penal codes. Note, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75 YALE L.J. 1364, app. II (1966).
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of a criminal statute as a legitimate means of expression on the stage."5
A live theatrical performance which, when viewed as a whole, is not
obscene is entitled to the same first amendment protections as is any
other medium for the communication of ideas.2" The violation of a
criminal statute, however, may not be the kind of activity intended to be
protected by the first amendment.
The Barrows case suggests that legislative intent may be the
dominant factor in most decisions regarding the use of public lewdness
statutes in determining the boundaries of freedom of expression in the
theater. If this is the case, it will be imperative that legislatures clarify
their intent that the lewdness provisions are to be inapplicable to live
stage productions. This could be accomplished by providing a specific
exemption for those activities which the legislature chooses to immunize
from prosecution. In at least one jurisdiction, a simple one sentence
statement has in the past served as an effective indicator of legislative
intent."' The legislature may, however, determine that its particular
lewdness statute should be applied to live theatrical presentations. Before
implementing such an express intention, a court will have to determine
that all first amendment protections have been satisfied.
CONCLUSION
The boundary between criminal activity and legitimate theatrical
expression can neither be drawn permanently nor with absolute precision.
The theatrical line of demarcation for legitimate experimentation will
reflect the dynamic nature of society's constantly changing mores and
social values. The theater has traditionally been a shaper and formulator
of social change, while the judiciary has had the role of defender of the
status quo.2" With such diverse roles and functions, it is not difficult
to understand why a heated conflict has developed between these two
25. In People v. Bercowitz, 61 Misc. 2d 974, 308 N.Y.S.2d 1 (City Ct. 1970), the
New York public lewdness statute was applied to a live performance of the play Che.
26. Live theatrical performances are entitled to the same protection under the first
amendment as: 1) motion pictures, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495
(1952) ; 2) magazines, Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) ; 3) newspapers,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 259 (1964).
27. The provision was made in the former penal law of New York which was
amended in 1967. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1104 (b) (McKinney 1967).
28. The theater has long been a significant medium for the communication of
ideas which affected public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from
direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which
characterizes all artistic expression. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495
(1952).
Interesting commentaries on the social and political role of the judiciary can be
found in JACOB, JusTicE IN AMERIcA 17-33 (1965) and MARSHALL, INTENTION IN
LAW AND SocIETa 179-82 (1968).
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American institutions. On a macro-analytic level, this conflict produces
a viable social system while preserving a degree of stability. As important
as this conflict may be to the overall direction of the American social
system, it has much more immediate and personal ramifications to the
individuals involved.
On a micro-analytic level, the conflict appears to be little more than
performers and producers being fined and imprisoned when they go
beyond the current bounds of acceptable expression. From a pragmatic
point of view, performers who chose to participate in the theatrical age
of Aquarius may find it advantageous to check the local lewdness
provisions or be prepared for uninvited backstage visitors.
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